SMU Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law

Article 1

January 1980

Torts
Page Keeton

Recommended Citation
Page Keeton, Torts, 34 SW L.J. 1 (1980)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol34/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

PART I: PRIVATE LAW
TORTS
by
Page Keeton*
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A.

Current Unrest

It is now generally accepted that one engaged in the business of supplying products of a particular kind for use by others is subject to liability in
tort, notwithstanding lack of negligence, when the product supplied is in a
defectively dangerous condition.' This principle has brought a change in
tort law that has often been regarded as revolutionary. 2 The magnitude of
the effect of the elimination of proof of negligence as a basis for recovery,
however, depends primarily on the nature of the strict liability system that
has been substituted for the prior negligence system as well as the changes
that subsequently have occurred in the negligence system.
Prior to 1960, there were at least three obstacles to recovery by a plaintiff
suing under a negligence theory apart from the necessity of proving that
some kind or character of negligence by the defendant was a cause of a
damaging event out of which a claimant's injury arose. These obstacles
were (1) limitations on the duty of care, such as the rule that there was no
duty to guard against obvious design hazards; 3 (2) legal or proximate cause
rules fixing limits to legal liability, 4 and (3) defenses such as contributory
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern
Methodist University. W. Page Keeton Professor of Law in Torts, University of Texas.
1. See Keeton, ProductLiability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 3334 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacyof Information, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 398,
404 (1970).
2. See Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? 4 Response to the Product Liability
Crisis, 14 FORUM 251, 251-52 (1978); Wysocki, Litigation Load, Wall St. J., June 3, 1976, at
1, col. 6.
3. Camp v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), overruled, Micallefv. Miehle
Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976), was the classic products liability case on obvious
dangers. Plaintifrs hands were caught and injured in the revolving steel rollers of an onion
topping machine manufactured by the defendant. The notion that there is no duty to guard
against obvious design hazards has been one of the most firmly entrenched doctrines of
products liability law. See Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1971);
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855,
(1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
4. See Gordon v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1191 (5th Cir. 1978)
(employer-employee relationship relevant in determining intervening and superseding
causes). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965) on intervening acts as
superseding causes.
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negligence and voluntary assumption of the risk. 5
The substitution of a product defect theory for a negligence theory as an
alternative basis for recovery would not have been so drastic in itself, except for the fact that in most states, and clearly in Texas, the courts chose
to alter or eliminate most of the above enumerated substantive limitations
to liability under a negligence theory: (1) the "no-duty" rules, (2) the proximate cause rules, and (3) the available defenses. Thus, with the introduction of a product defect theory of recovery, it became necessary to develop
an entirely new set of rules and principles for establishing limits to liability. In developing the strict liability system, three major changes were implemented: (1) the "no-duty" rules were eliminated for the most part; 6 (2)
contributory negligence was abrogated as a defense and the narrow defense of unforeseeable misuse was substituted therefor;7 and (3) in Texas,
at least, it was held that a defect need only be a producing cause rather
than a proximate
cause of the damaging event in which the claimant is
8
injured.
Contemporaneous with the development of a strict liability system,
courts made substantial changes to the negligence theory of recovery by
altering and modifying the limitations to liability, both as to users of products as well as to suppliers. Thus, most courts have held that a manufacturer has a duty to take such precautions as a reasonable person would
take to eliminate obvious design hazards, so that recovery is now obtainable on a negligence or fault theory as well as a theory of product defect or
strict liability. 9 Likewise, contributory negligence has been eliminated as a
complete bar to recovery. 10 With these changes, much of the original justi5. For a discussion of the defenses of voluntary assumption of the risk and contributory negligence in Texas, see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 2, 2-6
(1976) and Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. I, 7-16 (1974).
6. The best example of the elimination of the "no-duty" rules of the negligence cause
of action relates to the no-duty rule regarding obvious design hazards and its corollary principle that a seller could satisfy any duty of care regarding latent design hazards by giving
reasonably adequate warnings. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571,
577 (1976) (no-duty rule too harsh in today's mechanized society); Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975) (obviousness no defense to strict liability).
7. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977) (plaintiff's
damages should be reduced when misuse is a concurring proximate cause), overruled, Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979); Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1974) (contributory negligence no defense to strict liability),
overruled, Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979).
8. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 351; Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d at 801.
9. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976), in which the
court clearly holds that the patent or obvious danger rule was abolished as to the negligence
theory as well as to the theory of strict liability. Id. at 577. The obviousness of a design
hazard is relevant in both strict liability and negligence theories, but it is conclusive in
neither. The likelihood of harm diminishes when a danger is obvious, since it is reasonable
to assume that the user will exercise special care in the light of the known hazard. Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afdmem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
10. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980). This statute was
reviewed in the Annual Survey in 1974. See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 1, 7-16 (1974).
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fication for the development of a complete new structure for strict liability
has been removed.
There still exists uncertainty and confusion as to recovery against a supplier on a theory of strict liability, either in tort or for breach of a warranty.
Three substantive issues have perhaps been the source of most of this uncertainty and confusion: (1) the meaning of defect in the design area;' I (2)
the kind of conduct on the part of a victim, user or otherwise, that constitutes a defense that bars or diminishes recovery; 12 and (3) the kind of conduct, if any, on the part of a third party, that constitutes a "new and
independent cause" or a "superseding cause," thereby breaking the chain
3
of legal causation.'
Personal injury litigation has been notably affected by all of these developments in tort law in two fundamental ways. First, the ultimate resolution of personal injury claims, by out-of-court settlements or through
litigation, has become an involved, tortuous, and difficult undertaking in a
large percentage of occurrences. Secondly, the liability for the personal
injuries and deaths of those engaged in our private enterprise system by
way of delivering necessary and desirable goods and services has been materially expanded, possibly leading to a variety of adverse side effects related to the availability and cost of insurance, business failures, product
development, and costs of goods and services to the ultimate consumer.' 4
Presently, three factors are causing complexity in the products liability
area. In the first place, it often can reasonably be argued that there are
multiple parties tortiously responsible under existing rules of substantive
11. See generaly Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability. Is There a Better
Approach? 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976); Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability" The Meaning of

"Defect" in the Manufactureand Design of Products,20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Keeton, ProductLiability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liabiliyfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
12. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816, 828 (1978)
(abnormal use or misuse); Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28, 30-31
(1973) (abnormal use or misuse); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351
(Tex. 1977) (unforeseeable misuse). See also Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403
(1978).
13. There is considerable doubt as to whether the doctrine of new and independent
cause or superseding cause will be recognized in Texas. In Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 344, the
Texas Supreme Court indicated that misconduct of a third party, however unforseeable, is
not a cause that prevents a product defect from being a producing cause if it is a "but-for"
cause. Id. at 351 n.3. In most states, the same type of intervening misconduct that constitutes a superseding cause in a negligence theory also does so in a theory of strict liability.
See Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1973); Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11.
2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974). There are, however, views such as that expressed in
Comment, SubstantialChange. Alteration of a Product as a Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict
Liability, 80 DICK. L. REV. 245, 264 (1974), to the effect that intervening conduct bringing
about a change of a product should not bar recovery when the original design was a "butfor" cause of the accident. According to the Comment, the only change that should bar
recovery is an alteration that is the sole cause of the harm. Id.
14. The Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability in its final report indicated that the impact of product liability claims on suppliers generally had been felt in four
areas: (a) availability and cost of insurance; (b) business failures; (c) impact on product
development; and (d) increased costs in product liability prevention. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL REPORT V-48 (1977).
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law for a particular damaging event. This multiple liability is in part due
to the growing complexity of our industrialized and technological society
and in part to changes in the substantive law. The second complicating
factor is that those tortfeasors involved in a damaging event as suppliers
may be subject to liability on any one of three alternative theories: negligence; strict liability in tort; or breach of warranty.15 Finally, the defenses
and other limitations on liability are different for each theory, making it
difficult to submit some cases to the jury in a way that can be understood
6
by them.'
All of these developments, coupled with an increase in the average
award or payment in product liability cases, have brought forth the charge
that a crisis exists in products liability law similar to that which allegedly
existed several years ago as a consequence of the large volume of medical
malpractice claims. 17 A nationwide counterattack to the above judicial developments has been launched in the halls of most state legislative
branches, as well as in the Congress of the United States.' 8 An unsuccessful attack was made in the last regular session of the Texas legislature, but
there is a strong likelihood that a renewal of some proposals will be made
in the next session.
Shortly after a special session in 1977, the Texas Speaker of the House of
Representatives created an Interim Study Committee, which developed
some recommendations for rather drastic changes in the substantive law as
to the tort liability of those who make and sell products. 19 Three of the
most important recommendations were (1) the elimination of design de15. Like most states, Texas permits claimants who are purchasers or members of the
family of purchasers to recover for personal injuries or death under theories of negligence,
strict liability, or breach of warranty. See Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974) (drugs, strict liability tort theory); McKisson v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (permanent wave preparation, strict liability tort theory). See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Vernon 1968) (recovery of
consequential damages for an injury to person or property); id. § 2.719 (limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods).
16. For differences in result depending upon the theory of recovery, see Signal Oil &
Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978), commented on in Keeton,
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 1, 23 (1979); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), discussed in Note, GeneralMotors Corp. v. Hopkins. The
Misuse Defense When Design Defect and PlaintMff Misuse COncur to Cause Injury, 31 Sw. L.J.
940 (1977); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975), commented on in Keeton, Torts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 2, 6-11 (1976); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519
S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), commented on in Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw.
L.J. 2, 7-8 (1975).
17. See note 2 supra. Manufacturers and insurers united in an effort to effect legislative
solutions and went to the White House. The result: creation in 1976 of a Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, working under the Department of Commerce.
18. Numerous legislative proposals for reform have been considered by state legislatures throughout the country, and some legislative changes have been made. See IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-4-20A-1 to -8 (Burns Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 411.300-.350 (Supp. 1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03(1) (West Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-224, -702, -21,180
to -21,182 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.900-.915 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-1
to -6 (1977).
19. See TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 65TH LEGISLATURE, REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE STUDY ON PRODUCT LIABILITY (1978).
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fects from the scope of strict liability; (2) the establishment of the doctrine
of comparative fault in strict liability cases by defining "defect" in a product to be "fault"; and (3) the adoption of a statute of repose that would
prevent any claim from being brought against a supplier after a specified
20
period of time, running from the date of the sale of the product.
A number of bills were introduced in both the house and the senate, but
most of the recommendations were incorporated in an omnibus package
bill in the house. 2 1 This effort at reform was not successful, but no doubt
further efforts will be made in the next regular session. Legislative reform
attempts in Texas to date have not adequately balanced all of the interests
in such a way as to produce a final result that would be in the public interest. Rather, there has been an overreaction to a complex problem.
B.

Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect

As indicated above, one of the substantive issues that has produced a
vast amount of confusion and difference of opinion in the products liability area relates to the identification of the kind of design hazard in a product that will be regarded as justifying the conclusion that the product was
defectively dangerous. A product can be defective as marketed if there
exists (1) a flaw in the product, (2) a failure adequately to warn or to use
proper means to warn about a design hazard, or (3) a defective design as
such.

22

A flaw in a product is an abnormality or an unintended condition of the
product-such as the bubble in a tire that causes an explosion-which, to
be defectively dangerous or "unreasonably dangerous," must be a flaw
that makes the product more dangerous than it would have been if it had
been as intended. 23 If this flaw occurs in the manufacturing process, it is
normally referred to as a construction defect. Thus, the term "flaw" is easy
to define, and no liability necessarily accompanies the determination that a
flaw exists.
When a claim is based on the ground that a specific flaw or a flaw of
some kind was a cause of a damaging event, the important issue is whether
the nature and quality of the evidence is sufficient to justify the twin findings that a "dangerous flaw" existed at the time of sale by the defendant
and that such flaw was a producing cause of the damaging event out of
which the claimant's injury arose. 24 It is quite clear that negligence, either
20. Id.
21. H.B. 1161, House Bill on First Reading, TEX. H.R.J. 442, 443 (1979).
22. See Keeton, Products Liability--Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 398,
402-04 (1970).
23. For two recent cases discussing the important difference between a "flaw" in a product and a "design" hazard, see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443 (1978)
and Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
24. See Jastrzembski v. General Motors Corp., 100 F. Supp. 465, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 614, 271 N.W.2d 777, 780-81 (1978); Moraca
v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332 A.2d 599, 601 (1975); Scanlon v. General Motors Corp.,
65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673, 677 (1974); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J.
177, 199 A.2d 826, 829 (1964). There are various problems in proving the existence of flaws
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in the creation of or the failure to discover the flaw, is not a prerequisite to
25
recovery.
When the defect alleged is that of failure or inadequacy of warnings, the
claimant in most states must prove that the defendant supplier knew or
should have known of the existence of a hazard and failed to take adequate precautions to inform reasonably foreseeable users of the hazard
and how to avoid it.26 While an inadequate warning is referred to as a
kind of defect that subjects the seller to recovery on a theory of strict liability, 27 this characterization has resulted in much confusion since in most
28
states, recovery for a defect of this kind requires proof of negligence.
Liability is strict only in the sense that recovery under a product defect
theory involves the defenses and limitations to liability applicable to strict
liability rather than to negligence liability.
Finally, as to the meaning of defect in relation to design hazards, much
confusion and perplexity has resulted from the fact that courts have utilized a number of different ways to formulate a standard or test by which a
design can be evaluated from the standpoint of its dangerousness. The
latest formulation was enunciated by the Texas Supreme Court in the second and final opinion in Turner v. General Motors Corp.29 In Turner a
motorist was injured when the roof of his car collapsed when the car rolled
in products. See generally Barker, Circumstantial Evidence in Strict Liability Cases, 38 ALB.
L. REV. 11 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence,
19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
25. The notable example is the case that initiated strict liability, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (flaw in the steering mechanism of a
Plymouth). See also Goldberg v. Kallsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963) (flaw in airplane's altimeter).
26. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 1974) (epoxy
paint); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1974) (Sabin oral
vaccine); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratores, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128-30 (9th Cir. 1968) (Sabin oral
vaccine); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1972) (freon). See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes ofAge, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976).
27. An "ample" or "reasonable" warning is a warning that discharges the duty of reasonable care. See Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (1978). See
also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974) (insulation product containing asbestos). The Borel court stated:
An insulation worker, no less than any other product user, has a right to decide whether to expose himself to the risk. Furthermore, in cases such as the
instant case, the manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of an expert.
This is relevant in determining (1) whether the manufacturer knew or should
have known the danger, and (2) whether the manufacturer was negligent in
failing to communicate this superior knowledge to the user or consumer of its
product.
Id. at 1089 (citation omitted).
28. See, e.g., Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961); West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972); Erny v. Revlon, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 261
(Mo. 1970).
29. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). The supreme court initially handed down an opinion
on March 21, 1979. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272 (March 21,
1979). Attention was directed in last year's Annual Survey article to this first opinion by way
of an addendum to some coments on the subject. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1979). This opinion was later withdrawn and replaced with the
present opinion. 584 S.W.2d at 845.
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over, placing the crashworthiness of the vehicle in issue. At trial the jury
answered the following issue in the affirmative:
Special Issue No. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time
the automobile in question was manufactured by General Motors the
roof structure was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
design that is unreasonably dangerous.
"Unreasonably dangerous" means dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
knowledge common to the community
purchases it, with the ordinary
30
as to its characteristics.
Thus, a consumer contemplation test was used by the trial court to determine defective design. This test is frequently approved in judicial opinions throughout the country. 3 1 Sometimes it is utilized as the only measure
32
of when a design hazard is to be regarded as unreasonably dangerous. It
has also been approved as one of two ways by which to evaluate a design
from the standpoint of dangerousness. 33 For reasons set forth in last year's
Annual Survey article on torts, 34 I have not approved of the use of the test,
either as an alternative basis or as the sole basis for determining whether
or not a design makes a product "unreasonably dangerous." If the task of
evaluating designs is to be undertaken, it has been my position for quite
35
some time that there should be a balancing of danger against utility.
Some commentators take the position that the design choices of product
manufacturers should not be evaluated because of the difficulties in taking
account of the various factors that are involved and quantifying the weight
to be given to these factors. 36 The problem of weighing danger against
30. 584 S.W.2d at 846.

31. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979); Maas v.
Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191, 194 (1969); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg.
Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408,
470 P.2d 135, 138 (1970); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774,
779 (1975).
32. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806, 808 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
33. See Barker v. Lull Eng., Co., 573 P.2d 443, 445-56 (Cal. 1978); Henderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d at 92.
34. Keeton, supra note 29, at 9-10. The consumer contemplation test is inappropriate as
a test for identifying a defectively dangerous design hazard for several reasons: (I) the mere
fact a product has a risk not contemplated by the seller, purchaser, or other user should not
result automatically in a finding that the product as formulated is defective; (2) the mere fact
that a product is not more dangerous than is contemplated does not, standing alone, require
a finding that it is a defective product; and (3) the standard is vague and impractical. Id.
35. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 3738 (1973), in which the author states:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of
trialoutweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices.- The
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utility and giving consideration to the factors related to these two matters,
however, is something that the courts and juries often do, consciously or
not, in passing upon negligence questions. 37 When it is said that negligence is the failure to exercise the care of the ordinary person, the court is
asking the jury to decide whether the community sense of justice and morality justifies the risk created by the defendant through his conduct, in
light of (a) benefits flowing from the conduct and (b) alternative ways of
benefits with less danger, albeit with perhaps some adobtaining the same
38
ditional burden.
The consumer contemplation test as given by the trial court in Turner
has been utilized repeatedly by trial judges in Texas with the apparent
approval of the supreme court. 39 Therefore, the supreme court upheld the
judgment of the trial court, but stated that in the future the test will not
contain "either the element of the ordinary consumer or of the prudent
manufacturer. ' 40 As a substitute for the issue submitted by the trial court,
the supreme court set forth an issue that it considered to be appropriate:
Special Issue No. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time
the [product] in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer] the
[product] was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.
'4 1
Answer: "We do" or "We do not."
Last year in the Annual Survey article on torts, I proposed the following
Limits of.Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1558 (1973); Polelle, The Foreseeabiiity
Concept and Strict Products Liability. The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 101,
135 (1976). See generally Holford, The Limits ofStrict Liabilityfor Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 81, 92-95 (1973).

37. Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947), said in discussing the negligence of a custodian of a barge that broke loose from its
moorings while the custodian was absent:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and
since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty,
as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function
of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity
of the resulting injury if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.
Id. at 173. See Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931), in which the
court stated:
One driving a car in a thickly populated district, on a rainy day, slowly and in
the most careful manner, may do injury to the person of another by throwing
muddy or infected water upon that person. Society does not hold the actor
responsible because the benefit of allowing people to travel under such circumstances so far outweighs the probable injury to bystanders that such conduct is not disapproved. Circumstances may require the driver of a fire truck
to take his truck through a thickly populated district at a high rate of speed
Id. at 376.
38. See Van Skike v. Zussman, 22 I11.App. 3d 1039, 318 N.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1974).
39. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 347 n.1 (Tex. 1977); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1974).
40. 584 S.W.2d at 847.
41. Id. at 847 n.l.
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test, slightly revised to provide for a general submission when a product
allegedly has been designed improperly in more than one way:
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed.
A product is unreasonably dangerous as designed if a reasonable
person would conclude that the magnitude of the danger infact, as it is
proved to be at the trial, from intended and reasonably foreseeable
uses, outweighs its utility or usefulness.
[The magnitude of the danger of the product as designed is affected
by such matters as the degree of likelihood of injury producing events
from misuse and unintended uses as well as from intended and proper
uses, the seriousness of the harm that is likely to result when such
events do occur, and the obvious nature of the danger and therefore
the extent to which harm can be avoided by proper use. The utility or
usefulness of a product as designed is affected by such matters as the
importance of the need that is served by the product, the practicability
or feasibility, both from a scientific and economic standpoint, by serving that need with a safer design, and the availability of other products, if any, to serve the same needs and wants about as well with
greater safety] 42
That part of the proposed charge in brackets is so designated because of
some doubt whether to include such material on the relevant factors in the
43
charge to the jury.
Several propositions can be drawn from the supreme court's final opinion in Turner. Some of these are:
(1) The requirement that a defect render the product "unreasonably
dangerous" reflects a realization that products have both utility and danger. Therefore, a balancing of a product's danger against its utility is required in the evaluation of product designs. 4
(2) "Unreasonably dangerous" is a term that needs some explanation.
this question, it is to consider a
The jury is to be advised that in4answering
5
product's utility and its danger.
(3) In its original opinion, the court was disinclined to give any charge
to the jury about "unreasonably dangerous," because of the difficulty of
trying to charge on the various factors without confusing them and being
counterproductive. 46 In the final opinion, the court decided to approve a
balancing charge. The court, however, has disapproved of any attempt to
charge the jury on the different factors and considerations that are relevant
47
in measuring the magnitude of the danger and the utility of the conduct,
such as I have suggested in the bracketed part of the proposed charge set
42. See Keeton, supra note 29, at 13 (emphasis added).
43. The Texas Supreme Court does not require a balancing of enumerated factors in
jury submissions. See 584 S.W.2d at 848-49.
44. See id. at 847.
45. Id. In the first opinion that was withdrawn, the court stated that no definition of
"unreasonably dangerous" should be given to the jury. See 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 273.
46. See 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 273.
47. See 584 S.W.2d at 848-49.
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forth above. The opinion of the court of civil appeals in Turner, as stated
in last year's Annual Survey article, 48 illustrates some of the dangers. I
remain convinced, however, that a "pattern instruction" on the factors
could be developed that would not be misleading or erroneous and would
contribute to the jury's understanding. 49 If not, then perhaps since this
for a jury to utilize, it should be treated as an issue of
issue is too complex
50
law for the court.
(4) In deciding when a design is defective, no distinction should be
made between design hazards that cause accidents and those that merely
aggravate injuries received in accidents caused in other ways. 5'
(5) Both parts of the bifurcated test for submission of the issue of design defect to the jury, as set forth in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co. ,52
whatever its meaning, will no longer be applicable. The test in Henderson
states that a product is unreasonably dangerous if: (1) it is so likely to be
harmful to persons or property that a reasonable, prudent manufacturer
who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it on
the market, or (2) it is dangerous to such an extent that it would not meet
53
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.
According to the supreme court in Turner, the notion underlying the prudent manufacturer test was that the additional perspective of the prudent
manufacturer is to the advantage and for the benefit of the plaintiff since it
could apply to obvious dangers and to situations where the consumer had
no definite expectations. 54 The court concluded, however, that this reason
did not justify its continued use. 55 There should be no difference, in theory, between a reasonable seller approach and a reasonable consumer approach to the question of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.
The ultimate question is whether the mythical reasonable person would
conclude that the danger outweighs the utility. This was quite clearly perceived by the Oregon Supreme Court,5 6 and this is apparently the conclu48. See Keeton, supra note 29, at 14-15.

49. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), in which the
court stated:
While a lay finder of fact is obviously competent in resolving a dispute as to
the condition of a product, an entirely different question is presented where a
decision as to whether that condition justifies placing liability upon the supplier must be made. . . . Should an ill-conceived design which exposes the
user to the risk of harm entitle one injured to recover? . . . When does the
utility of a product outweigh the unavoidable danger it may pose? These are
questions of law and their resolution depends upon social policy.
Id. at 1025-26 (citation omitted).
51. 584 S.W.2d at 847.
52. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
53. Id. at 92.
54. See 584 S.W.2d at 850.
55. Id. at 85 1.
56. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), in which the
court stated:
[W]e feel that the two standards [a seller-oriented standard and a user-oriented standard] are the same because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing.
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sion that has now been reached by the Texas Supreme Court. All that is
being asked of the jury is to do what it has been asked to do over and over
again on the negligence issue-weigh danger against utility, but with one
fundamental difference as pointed out below.
(6) The elimination from the charge to the jury of all reference to the
considerations and factors that normally are relevant in ascertaining the
magnitude of the danger of a product as designed and the utility of the
product as so designed does not mean that the court and the jury are not to
be influenced by such factors. Indeed, there is no way to balance danger
against utility without doing so. Such factors are important in determining
the kinds of evidence that will be admissible, the sufficiency of the eviof defect, and the nature of the arguments
dence needed to justify a finding
57
that can be made to the jury.
(7) In a concurring opinion in Turner, two justices dissented from the
views of the majority in discarding the consumer-contemplation test as
used by the trial judge and approved in the commentary to section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 8 Three ideas are expressed in this concurring opinion. The first is that a product should be regarded as unreasonably dangerous in any case where it is more dangerous in some respect
than would be contemplated, regardless of its beneficial characteristics,
and even if the risk or hazard was not susceptible to discovery by the manufacturer.5 9 Secondly, instructing the jury to consider such evidentiary
factors as danger and utility compels the jury to decide the issue of defect
solely on the basis of the fault or nonfault of the manufacturer. 60 Finally,
the majority opinion does not sfate if its new form of submission would be
applicable to alleged defects in6 products other than those attributable to
the way a product is designed. '
The resolution of the issue as framed by the majority in Turner could be
construed to require a finding of negligence. Since it is the defendant's
product and not the defendant's conduct that is being evaluated, however,
there is a substantial and quite significant difference. Under a negligence
theory, the plaintiff must impugn the conduct of the defendant. To do so,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to have perceived the danger of a risk or hazard relative to
the way a product is designed. 62 Under a theory of strict liability, however, when only the product must be impugned, it is the magnitude of the
That is to say, a manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given
product, considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which
fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it.
Id. at 1037.
57. See 584 S.W.2d at 847.

58. Id. at 853.
59. Id. at 854.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145 (4th ed. 1971), in which it
is stated: "[Niegligence is a matter of risk-that is to say, of recognizable danger of injury. . . . Against this probability, and gravity of the risk, must be balanced in every case
the utility of the type of conduct in question." Id. at 173.
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danger in fact as proved at the trial that is important to consider, and not
whether that danger could or should have been appreciated. This is an
important distinction; it can be especially important on the admissibility of
certain kinds of evidence, such as evidence of accident history after a product was designed or evidence of a change in design attributable to increased knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of a particular
design. 63 It is my assumption that the majority opinion is referring to the
danger in fact of the product as designed, and not the foreseeable danger
of the product as so designed.
As regards "flaws" in the manufacture of products, it would seem that a
product is defectively dangerous per se if the flaw makes the product more
dangerous than the product would have been as intended. Thus, a decomposed mouse in a soft drink bottle makes the beverage defectively dangerous, and a bubble in a tire makes the tire defectively dangerous. 64 The
only questions for the jury are those related to causation and the existence
of the flaw at the time the defendant surrendered possession. In order to
establish a marketing defect, however, there must be proof that the supplier knew or should have known of the hazard and breached a duty of
ordinary care to adequately warn. 65 It is a negligence issue in the guise of
strict liability.
C. State of the Art
"State of the art" is a term that has been used in products liability litigation pertaining to design hazards to mean quite different things. There are
at least four different and distinguishable usages. It is often used, especially by defense counsel, to refer to the customary practices in an industry, and therefore in products liability litigation to the customary way of
designing a product.66 It is frequently used to mean that which is feasible,
as distinguished from that which is customary, i e., that which is reasonably capable of being done, technically and economically, to reduce a risk
or hazard. 67 It is also used at times to mean that which is possible within
63. See Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 526 (8th Cir. 1977) (recall letter deemed
admissible); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1975)
(post-accident design change deemed admissible); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis.
2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680, 683-84 (1977) (evidence of subsequent remedial changes deemed
admissible); Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk, 151 N.J. Super. 422, 376 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1977)
(recall letters deemed admissible). See generally Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, 7 FORUM 1 (1971); Evidence in California and
Federal Courts. Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 9 U.
CAL. D. L. REV. 421 (1976).

64. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Phillips, The StandardforDeterminingDefectiveness in ProductsLiability, 46 U.
CIN. L. REV. 101, 115 n.71 (1977).
67. Nebraska's "reform" act defines it as "the best technology reasonably available at
the time." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (Supp. 1978). Cf Draft Uniform Product Liability
Law § 106(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998 (1979) ("state of the art" means the safety, technical,
mechanical, and scientific knowledge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time
of manufacture).
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the technology available to the manufacturer. 68 Finally, it is frequently
used to mean the technological capability of an industry, or the technological and economic feasibility of an industry to discover a risk or hazard that
exists in a product. 69 It is of utmost importance to distinguish between
these usages when dealing with the substantive effect of compliance with
the state of the art on issues related to the existence of a defect or a defense, and on the admissibility of evidence of the state of the art as to such
issues. The failure to do so has brought about much confusion.
Under the test for design defects proposed earlier, a product is defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous if the danger in fact outweighs the utility. That being so, it is irrelevant that the defendant in the
exercise of utmost care by way of utilizing the technological knowledge
and capabilities of an industry could not discover a hazard that caused the
harmful effects of such product to outweigh its utility. There is a conflict
on the issue of whether scientific lack of knowledge of a risk or hazard
should be a defense, 70 but if it is, then the judges that concurred in Turner
are nearly correct in arguing that there is little difference between strict
liability pursuant to a balancing test and negligence. The only difference
would be a change in the burden of proof.
There are three primary reasons for concluding that the danger in fact of
a product as designed can outweigh a product's utility. These reasons are
that: (1) the harmful consequences from a product's use exceed the benefits; (2) although the harmful consequence from a product's use does not
exceed the benefits, alternative products are available, such as a cosmetic
made from entirely different material, that will provide similar benefits
with less harmful consequences; or (3) there was or is now a way of designing the product with less harmful consequences.
The third argument for the position that a product is defective as
designed is that although the danger does not outweigh the benefits, the
danger was further reducible by an alternative design. This contention involves all of the first three usages of the term "state of the art" set forth
above. 7 1 It is difficult to find any support for the position that an unavoidably unsafe characteristic of a product at the time it was manufactured can
nevertheless make a product defective as designed simply because under
the state of the art at the time of trial it could have been designed more
68. See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.05(15), at 104.38
(1978).
69. See James, The UntowardEffects of Cigarettesand Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1557 (1966). See generally Keeton, ProductsLiability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131 (1972); Keeton, Some Observations
About the Strict Liabilityof the Maker of PrescriptionDrugs. The Aftermath of MER/29, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 149 (1968).
70. See note 67 supra. See also Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Div. of Sterling
Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974), in which the Texas Supreme Court said that "some
products, though manufactured as designed and intended, are so dangerous in fact that the
manufacturer should be liable for resulting harm though he did not and could not have
known of the danger at the time of marketing." Id. at 432.
71. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
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safely. 72 A maker's design of a product is to be evaluated from the standpoint of how safely a design engineer, charged with the danger that a product is found to have at the time of trial, could be reasonably expected to
design the product at the time of its manufacture. 73 Therefore, the state of
the art in all of the first three senses is relevant-custom, feasibility, and
possibility. If it was not technologically possible to design a safer product,
then if the danger did not outweigh the product's benefits, the product
would not be defective as a matter of law. Obviously, evidence of technological impossibility is admissible, and such evidence would be conclusive
if there was no evidence to support a contrary position. If a safer product
was technologically possible, evidence would still be admissible to indicate
lack of economic feasibility. Evidence of custom would also be admissible
as some indication of lack of feasibility, although quite obviously this
would not be conclusive.
In Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, Inc.74 the court of civil appeals was
confronted with the relevance of the failure to utilize a particular device to
minimize harm when the device was allegedly unavailable for commercial
use. The state of the art in the first three senses, therefore, was in issue.
The claimants were the widow and two adult children of Samuel Bailey,
who was killed in a boating accident. The deceased was thrown from the
boat while the engine was running. The plaintiffs asserted that the boat
was defectively designed in not having a "kill switch" that would automatically stop the engine in the event the operator was thrown from the boat.
The trial court, over the plaintiffs' objection admitted evidence indicating
the unavailability of kill switches to the manufacturer at the time of the
manufacture and sale of the boat. A switch had been invented at about the
time the boat was sold, but was not commercially available when the boat
was manufactured. The inventor testified, however, that the concept of kill
switches was not new and that the National Outboard Association had
used various types of switches for thirty years on racing boats. The court
of appeals held, with one judge dissenting, that such evidence was relevant
only to the issue of the care exercised by the defendant in the manufacturing process; such care is not a defense to strict liability in tort. 75 The Bailey decision was released at approximately the same time as the second
opinion of the supreme court in Turner, but the court of civil appeals correctly assumed that Henderson was still applicable to the meaning of a
design defect 76 , Bailey having been tried before the final decision in Turner was released. In deciding Bailey the court utilized a consumer-contemplation test and stated that the "expectation of the ordinary consumer
should be based on experience with the product itself, not the expert tech72. See generally 41 TENN. L. REV. 357 (1974).
73. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1976).

74. 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
75. Id. at 810 (citing Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978)).
76. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text. The court in Turner overruled Henderson to the extent that in the trial of strict liability cases involving design defects, the issue

and the accompanying instructions would henceforth not include the element of the ordinary consumer. 584 S.W.2d at 847.
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nological knowledge of the manufacturers within the industry."' 77 This is,
of course, a reasonable position if that test is applied literally and the necessity for balancing danger and utility is rejected. The court, however,
also relied on section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and cases
involving the inability of a supplier, under the existing state of the art, to
discover a flaw in a product. 78 Reliance on section 402A and on these
cases is misplaced. Section 402A states that the seller of a defective and
unreasonably dangerous product is subject to liability even though all
79
proper care has been exercised in the preparation or sale of his product.
This does not, however, indicate when a product is defective. A product is
defective when it leaves the seller's hands in a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, and such product will be unreasonably dangerous to him. 80 If the risk of harm to the consumer outweighs the utility of
the product, the seller also will not be relieved of liability because he has
exercised the utmost care. 8 1 The comments to section 402A, however,
point out that some products are, in the present state of human knowledge,
incapable of being made safe for their ordinary and intended use. If products at the time of their design are unavoidably unsafe in this sense, then
there is no seller's liability if such products are properly prepared and are
accompanied by proper directions and warning. 82 In Turner there was
substantial evidence of industry practice introduced by General Motors at
trial. The majority in Turner alluded to this evidence and indicated that
this evidence is relevant on the issue of product defect as well as on the
issue of supplier negligence. 83 If the state of the art in the sense of custom
is admissible to show that it is neither feasible nor practical to provide a
safer design, then, clearly, evidence that this manufacturer, who neither
made switches nor any component parts of the boats assembled, was unable to obtain the kill switch on the market was admissible to prove that
the product was not defective.
II.

INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION

As stated at the outset of this Survey article, the proliferation of products, because of advances in technology and changes in the substantive law
expanding the tort liability of those engaged in a variety of socially desirable activities, has increased the instances where multiple parties to an
event are held tortiously liable. This has produced new issues related to
the proper allocation of the costs of an accident between joint tortfeasors
and between those injured as a consequence of contributory negligence.
The common law rule that contributory negligence was a complete bar to
77. 585 S.W.2d at 808.
78. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 42 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897

(1970) (impure blood).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
81. Id. Comment a.
82. Id. Comment k.
83. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d at 852-53.
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recovery, except when the doctrines of last clear chance and discovered
peril were applicable, 84 was never defensible. The abandonment of confault, however, has
tributory negligence for the principle of comparative
85
added to the complexity of this allocation problem.
Early in Anglo-American law the rule developed that there would be no
contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors. 86 This was a necessary consequence of the principle that the law should not attempt to work
out equitable arrangements between wrongdoers. The majority of courts,
however, to alleviate the hardship of that early doctrine, developed rules of
indemnity. The right to recover was provided as a remedy when the parties were clearly not equally at fault. Courts developed a bewildering
number of theories, often criticized as unworkable and unsatisfactory, to
decide when this "all" rule of recovery would apply.87 Indemnity means
that a tortfeasor, who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another
tortfeasor, is obligated to indemnify the other tortfeasor. One easily administered rule was that a tortfeasor who was vicariously liable for the tort
of another had a right of indemnity against the actual wrongdoer. 88 Some
effort was also made to provide for indemnity between tortfeasors when all
were negligent. The Texas rule has been that where there are two or more
tortfeasors, either or all of whom are liable to an injured third person, but
one of whom has breached a duty owed both to his joint tortfeasor and to
who is blameless as to his
the injured third person, the tortfeasor
89
cotortfeasor will be allowed indemnity.
Contribution between joint tortfeasors, or the right to recover part of the
amount a tortfeasor paid to an injured party in settlement or as the result
of a judgment, has been provided for, either by statute or judicial decision,
in all but two or three states. 90 In Texas, contribution is currently available between tortfeasors, some or all of whom are strictly liable, on a pro
84. See Clark v. Boston & Maine R.R., 87 N.H. 444, 182 A. 175 (1935), notedin Note,
Negligence-Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance-The Doctrine as a Defense, 14 B.U. L. REV.
850 (1934); British Columbia Elec. Ry. v. Loach, 1916 Law Reports 719 (A.C. 1915); W.
PROSSER, supra note 62, §§ 65-66, at 416-33.

85. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975);

W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 67 at 433-39. See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a

(Vernon Supp. 1980).
86. I T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 490 (1906); see Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
87. See Hodges, Contribution And Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150,
157-63 (1947).
88. Id. at 154-55.
89. Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949); Hodges, supra
note 87, at 162.
90. Much has happened in this area of the law since Prosser wrote his fourth edition on
torts in 1971. At that time he stated that nine states had accepted the principle of contribution or a sharing of the costs by judicial decision and 23 states had adopted contribution by
statute. W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 50, at 307. In 1977 for example Illinois adopted contribution in a well-reasoned opinion of the state supreme court. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 II. 2d I, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977). See generaly UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939 version); Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contributions in Private Actions Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 779, 784-86 (1979).
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rata basis, 9' and between tortfeasors, all of whom are liable on a negli92
gence theory, on a percentage-of-fault basis.
A comparative fault statute was introduced in the last session of the
Texas Legislature that would have defined a defect in a product to be
"fault. ' 93 Contributory negligence would have become a defense that diminished recovery from the supplier of a defective product, just as it does
against the negligent user. 94 This proposal would have simplified some of
the contribution problems. It was included, however, in a bill that dealt
with other controversial products liability measures, and the bill failed to
pass.
Three cases of interest in this area were recently decided. They are Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. InternationalHarvester Co. ,95 CentralFreight
97
Lines v. Pride,96 and New Terminal Warehouse Corp. v. Wilson.
In Lubbock Manufacturing a tank-trailer combination manufactured by
Lubbock, carrying butane and propane, overturned and exploded. Fifty
people were injured or killed. Suit was brought, in which it was alleged
that the accident was caused by two distinct defects: a design defect in the
tank and a defect in the "fifth-wheel," a device that connected the tank to
the trailer. The alleged tortfeasors included Fontaine, the manufacturer of
the "fifth-wheel," International, the reseller of the "fifth-wheel," and Lubbock, the manufacturer of the tank.
Pursuant to a plea of privilege, all suits and claims as to International
were transferred to Dallas County. Both Fontaine and Lubbock were also
initially named as defendants, but the plaintiffs subsequently entered into

a "Mary Carter" settlement agreement with Fontaine. 98 Fontaine was
made a party to the law suit, however, for the purpose of ascertaining its
liability. Several plaintiffs entered into a covenant not to sue with Lubbock after the suit was filed. In these cases, judgments were entered
against Lubbock for the amounts specified in the settlement agreements.
The remaining plaintiffs did not settle and pursued their claims at trial.
The jury found that both the tank and the "fifth-wheel" were defective
and that each defect was a producing cause of the accident. Both Lubbock
91. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).
92. Id. art. 2212a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J.
1, 11 (1978).
93. H.B. 1181, House Bills on First Reading, TEX. H.R.J. 470, 471 (1979).
94. Id. at 471.
95. 584 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
96. 588 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
97. 589 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
98. Agreements with a settling defendant who remains a party at the trial and retains a
financial stake in the plaintiff's recovery have been called "Mary Carter" agreements since
the 1967 Florida decision Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967). See Comment, Mary CarterAgreements. Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. L.J. 799

(1978). The effect of "Mary Carter" agreements in Texas is discussed in General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977). The Texas Supreme Court held that
the exclusion of evidence as to the existence of this type of agreement is reversible error. 558
S.W.2d at 858-59. A Mary Carter settlement will apparently have the same effect in extinguishing a pro-rata part of the plaintiff's cause of action as in the ordinary settlement.
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and Fontaine, therefore, were held strictly liable in tort to the plaintiffs. 99
Lubbock thereafter filed a third party claim in the district court of Dallas
County for contribution against International, the reseller of the "fifthwheel," and International was granted summary judgment.
On appeal the court denied Lubbock's right of contribution from International because the settlement, and the judgment of the court entered
pursuant to the settlement agreement with Lubbock, did not extinguish
any cause of action the plaintiffs had against the nonsettling defendant. A
settling tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution from a nonsettling tortfeasor
unless the settlement extinguishes the injured party's cause of action
against all others.1°° At least one court of civil appeals has held that a
voluntary settlement will not satisfy the prerequisite for contribution under
the contribution statute' 01 because the statute by its terms only authorizes
contribution when a tortfeasor has satisfied a judgment that has been rendered against him.' 0 2 The rendition of an agreed judgment pursuant to a
settlement agreement, however, only satisfies the prerequisite for a judgment. The order of a trial court to pay an agreed amount in settlement is
not a sufficient basis for contribution when the plaintiff has retained his
claim against the nonsettling tortfeasor. In Texas, the settlement in such a
case only extinguishes a pro rata part of the plaintifis cause of action.
The Lubbock Manufacturing court also held that Lubbock was entitled
to contribution from the reseller of the "fifth wheel," International, as to
those plaintiffs who refused to settle with Lubbock and obtained a judgment and satisfaction for their entire damages.103 According to the court,
a reseller or a retailer of a defective product is subject to a claim for contribution by a third party tortfeasor, even after the manufacturer has been
released from liability, thereby eliminating any recovery over by way of
indemnity. Most courts, however, will and should hold that a reseller or a
retailer who is a mere conduit of the defective product, absent any independent act of negligence or conduct that adds to the danger of a defective condition of the product, has a right of indemnity over against the
manufacturer.'°4 While policy reasons may justify the reseller's strict liability to the injured party, the risk of ultimate loss should be on the manufacturer of the product. Retailers and resellers must depend on the
manufacturer for information about the dangers that inhere in the products they sell. This is, in fact, recognized in the law of implied warranties,
where it is not unusual for liability to move transactionally through the
chain of distribution to the manufacturer, who ultimately pays for the
99. 584 S.W.2d at 910.
100. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 30 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
101. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).

102. Lower Neches Valley Auth. v. City of Beaumont, 392 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref d n.r.e.).
103. 584 S.W.2d at 912-13.
104. See Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977); Kelly v. Han-

scom Bros., 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 331 A.2d 737 (1974); DiGregorio v. Champlain Valley
Fruit Co., 127 Vt. 562, 255 A.2d 183 (1969).

1980]

TORTS

breach of warranty. 0 5 A settlement was made in this case, therefore, with
a manufacturer who should have an obligation to indemnify the reseller.
If this is the case, the plaintiffs settled with a tortfeasor who had the obligation to indemnify another. Under these circumstances the indemnitee is
released.' 0 6 The court finally held that Lubbock's claim for contribution
was not collaterally estopped, because Texas law requires that the parties
be the same or in privity with one another, 0 7 and International was not a
party or in privity with a party to the action in the original suit.
In Central Freight Lines v. Pride10 8 the plaintiff was injured when his
automobile collided with a Central Freight Lines truck-trailer. The collision occurred when the truck-trailer jack-knifed, crossed over to the wrong
side of a two-lane highway, and crushed the plaintiffs car. B & B Company operated a dirt pit alongside the highway near the collision site.
Trucks coming from B & B's pit deposited large chunks of dirt and clay on
the highway. Despite efforts by B & B to clean up this material on the
roadway, considerable amounts remained on the highway, rendering it
very slick. Plaintiff sought judgement against B & B and Central jointly.
Each defendant filed third-party claims for contribution and indemnity
against the other. The jury found both Central and B & B guilty of negligence, apportioning two-thirds fault to Central and one-third fault to B &
B. The plaintiff was found free of contributory negligence. The trial court
granted Central complete indemnity against B & B and denied B & B any
relief as to the truck operators. Both defendants appealed. The court of
civil appeals concluded that B & B, in causing mud and dirt to be on the
highway, breached a duty of ordinary care both to the injured motorist
and to Central. B & B's conduct exposed Central's trucks and the plaintiff
motorist to an unreasonable risk of harm. The court concluded, therefore,
that B & B breached its duty to Central, but that Central breached no duty
to B & B, especially because B & B had no property on or near the place of
the accident likely to be damaged by the negligent driving of Central's
vehicle.
B & B argued that this test for indemnity no longer makes sense under a
comparative negligence system for allocating the costs of accidents between tortfeasors. The Texas comparative negligence statute makes no
provision for indemnity, as an exception to the rule of contribution, when
all joint tortfeasors are negligent and therefore subject to liability.' 0 9 Indemnity rules have always been based on the notion that one of two or
more tortfeasors should be regarded as primarily responsible when there is
a gross disparity in the culpability of the parties or when a party was only
105. See Kelley v. Hanscom Bros., 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 331 A.2d 737, 740 (1974).

106. The courts are not in accord on this point, and the fact situation is often determinative. A settlement with an employee, for example, should not release an employer because
the rule that permits an employer to obtain indemnity against an employee is questionable.
The enterprise should bear the cost of employee negligence. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1044
(1951).
107. 584 S.W.2d at 913.
108. 588 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
109. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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vicariously liable. Under a comparative negligence system, any disparity
in the fault of the negligent parties is considered in the apportionment of
negligence between or among the parties. A proper result and a proper
interpretation of the Texas comparative negligence statute is that indemnity has been eliminated. The court of civil appeals in New Terminal
Warehouse Corp. v. Wilson, 10o in fact, implies this result."' Thus, the decisions in Wilson and Pride conflict and the resolution of this issue is left to
the supreme court.
In Wilson the plaintiffs husband was struck and killed by a truck unloading grain on a dock. The jury found the plaintiffs husband 10% negligent, the defendant warehouse corporation 50% negligent, and the trucker
40% negligent. According to the court, the warehouse corporation
breached a duty to the trucker defendant as well as to the plaintiff." 2 The
trucker, however, did not breach a duty to the warehouse corporation.
The court, nevertheless, rejected the claim made by the trucker for indemnity, stating that there was no longer any rational reason for the application of an indemnity rule between negligent tortfeastors." 13 1 subscribe to
this proposition and agree that the nonapplicability of indemnity to such a
situation is supported by the absence of any provision in the comparative
negligence statute providing for indemnity.

110. 589 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
I 11. Id. at 469-70.
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